

THE RIGHT TO ALGORITHMIC EXPLANATION IN MIGRATION AND ASYLUM

Elisa Pandolfi*

ABSTRACT

Artificial intelligence (AI) and automated systems are nowadays increasingly implemented in the field of migration, asylum and border control management. From the prediction of migratory fluxes to the automated risk assessment of migrants, their deployment holds significant promise in terms of procedural efficiency, while, at the same time, posing serious risks of violation of fundamental rights. Amongst the forms of protection envisaged under EU law, Regulations (UE) 2016/679 (GDPR) and 2024/1689 (AI Act) introduce a right to explanation of algorithmic decision-making. The contribution will examine its applicability within the field of migration.

L'intelligenza artificiale (IA) e i sistemi automatizzati sono sempre più spesso implementati nel settore della migrazione, asilo e gestione del controllo delle frontiere. Dai sistemi predittivi dei flussi migratori a quelli di valutazione del rischio dei migranti, il loro utilizzo presenta vantaggi significativi in termini di efficienza procedurale, ponendo, allo stesso tempo, seri rischi di violazione dei diritti fondamentali. Tra i vari strumenti di tutela introdotti nell'ambito del diritto dell'Unione, i Regolamenti (UE) 2016/679 (GDPR) e (UE) 2024/1689 (AI Act) sanciscono un diritto alla spiegazione dei processi decisionali algoritmici. Il contributo ne esamina l'applicabilità nel contesto migratorio.

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduction. – 2. The implementation of automated and AI systems in migration and asylum. – 3. The right to algorithmic explanation under EU law. – 4. Conclusion.

1. Introduction

Algorithmic systems are nowadays increasingly deployed in the field of migration, undergoing a process of digitalisation. Across the EU, automated

** Ph.D. candidate in European Union Law at the University of Macerata.

and AI systems are experimented and integrated in border control and surveillance activities, while, at the same time, presenting significant opportunities to speed up the procedures for granting asylum and international protection.

Despite the beneficial effects in terms of procedural and administrative efficiency, the deployment of these systems entails serious risks of violation of fundamental rights of migrants, increasingly affected by decisions based on the algorithmic output.

In order to increase transparency and strengthen the level of protection of the individual, a right to explanation of algorithmic decision-making is recognised under both [Regulation \(UE\) 2016/679](#) (GDPR) and [Regulation \(EU\) 2024/1689](#) (AI Act).

The contribution will examine its specific applicability within the field of migration. Accordingly, after briefly mentioning the spectrum of possibilities connected to the integration of algorithmic systems in border management and asylum procedures, it will introduce the EU rules applicable to them. Following that, it will delve into the right to explanation, comparing the rules on solely automated systems, established under the GDPR, and on high-risk AI systems, introduced in the AI Act.

2. The implementation of automated and AI systems in migration and asylum

In recent years, the deployment, across the EU, of algorithmic systems in migration-related procedures has substantially increased¹. From the prediction of migratory fluxes to the automated risk assessment of migrants, these applications represent a promising instrument to ensure a more efficient management of external borders and asylum procedures.

¹ Between 2007 and 2020, over €341 million in public funding has been spent on projects developing new technologies for the purposes of immigration and border control. Cfr. STATEWATCH, [A Clear and Present Danger. Missing Safeguards on Migration and Asylum in the EU's AI Act](#), 2022, p. 26.

For the purpose of our analysis, the notion of algorithmic systems² refers to both automated and artificial intelligence (AI) systems. While the former are not specifically defined under EU digital law, the latter are described as machine-based systems designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and that may exhibit adaptiveness after deployment, and that infer, from the input they receive, how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions (art. 3 AI Act).

Algorithmic systems represent an essential component of the so-called «smart borders»³. Within the framework of border surveillance and border control activities⁴, they have been deployed: to monitor, analyse and predict migratory fluxes⁵, for instance in projects such as *ITFLOWS*, *Promenade* and *Odysseus*; to perform algorithmic profiling and risk assessment of migrants; in facial recognition and emotion recognition applications, the latter experimented at certain EU external borders, in projects such as *iBorderCtrl* and *AVATAR*.

Additionally, AI can be implemented in the various stages of the procedures to grant refugee status and international protection⁶, including: to automate document evaluation; to assess the credibility of asylum seekers; to identify the place of provenance of migrants, through systems of dialect and language recognition.

² The algorithm is a sequence of instructions, a procedure, which specifies a combination of actions to be performed in order to solve a problem. See, G. SARTOR, *L'informatica giuridica e le tecnologie dell'informazione*, Torino, 2022, p. 96.

³ Smart borders have been defined as «automated systems to speed up and facilitate the border check procedure of the majority of travellers, and to hinder and stop those immigrants that poses a threat to the security of the EU through their status as irregular immigrants, criminals or terrorists». See J. P. BURGESS, D. KLOZA (eds.), [*Border Control and New Technologies. Addressing Integrated Impact Assessment*](#), Brussels, 2021, p. 23.

⁴ On the use of AI at external borders, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, [*Opportunities and Challenges for the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Border Control, Migration and Security. Volume 1*](#), 2020; C. DUMBRAVA, [*Artificial Intelligence at EU Borders. Overview of Applications and Key Issues*](#), EPRS, 2021.

⁵ C. BLASI CASAGRAN, C. BOLAND, E. SÁNCHEZ-MONTIJANO, E. VILÀ SÁNCHEZ, [*The Role of Emerging Predictive IT Tools in Effective Migration Governance*](#), in *Politics and Governance*, vol. 9, n. 4, 2021, pp. 133 – 145; G. ROMEO, [*Gli strumenti di previsione dei flussi migratori: quali problemi giuridici*](#), in *ADiM Blog, Analisi & Opinioni*, dicembre 2022.

⁶ On the use of AI in asylum procedures, see N. KINCHIN, D. MOUGOUEI, [*What Can Artificial Intelligence Do for Refugee Status Determination? A Proposal for Removing Subjective Fear*](#), in *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 2022, 34, pp. 373 – 397; A. PALAZZI, [*Quando l'Intelligenza Artificiale \(IA\) contribuisce a decidere in materia di asilo: prospettive e questioni aperte nel diritto dell'Unione europea*](#), in *Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza*, 3/2025, pp. 1 – 26.

Alongside their great potential in terms of procedural and administrative efficiency, the diffusion of automated and AI systems carries with it substantial risks of violation of fundamental rights. Being data-driven and intrinsically opaque technologies, their implementation can deeply interfere with the right to data protection and non-discrimination. Moreover, insofar as migration-related procedures are concerned, they inevitably interfere with the right to asylum and international protection.

Finally, despite being commonly perceived as objective and neutral tools, algorithmic systems tend to reproduce the bias inherent in the training dataset, whose quality and representativeness ultimately influence the final output. Accordingly, the misleading perception that they can prevent human error may result in the fact that the human agent over-relies on the algorithmic decision (the so-called automation bias).

Accordingly, ensuring the accuracy, non-discriminatory nature and transparency of AI systems used in the area of migration has been acknowledged by the EU legislator as a fundamental prerequisite to guarantee the respect of the fundamental rights of migrants, who are often in a particularly vulnerable position and are dependent on the outcome of the actions of the competent public authorities⁷.

Against this background, AI systems intended to be used in the field of migration, asylum and border control management fall under the scope of application of the AI Act⁸. Following a risk-based approach, this regulation introduces a comprehensive legal framework on AI models and systems. The latter are categorised according to four levels of risk, depending on their implications for health, safety and fundamental rights.

Certain systems used in the field of migration are considered “high-risk” and, therefore, they are subject to a series of stringent requirements imposed on providers and deployers. These are, respectively, the person placing the

⁷ Recital 60, AI Act.

⁸ For a comment of these rules, see E. BROUWER, [EU's AI Act and Migration Control. Shortcomings in Safeguarding Fundamental Rights](#), in *Verfassungsblog*, 12 December 2024; N. VAVOULA, [Regulating AI at Europe's Borders: Where the AI Act Falls Short](#), in *Verfassungsblog*, 13 December 2024; L. S. STEWART, [The Regulation of AI-Based Migration Technologies under the EU AI Act: \(Still\) Operating in the Shadows?](#), in *European Law Journal*, n. 30, 2024, pp. 122 – 135; E. PANDOLFI, *Migrazioni algoritmiche: l'AI Act e la regolazione europea delle tecnologie di frontiera*, in M. INGLESE, A. ROSANÒ (a cura di), [I 40 Anni dell'accordo di Schengen: risultati e prospettive. Atti del Convegno Università di Parma 18-19 dicembre 2025](#), n. 1, Napoli, 2026, pp. 149 – 174.

system on the market and the one using it at a professional level (art. 3 AI Act).

According to Annex III, these rules apply to: (a) polygraphs or similar tools; (b) risk assessment systems used towards a natural person who intends to enter or who has entered into the territory of a Member State; (c) systems used to assist competent public authorities for the examination of applications for asylum, visa or residence permits and for associated complaints with regard to the eligibility of the natural persons applying for a status, including related assessments of the reliability of evidence; (d) systems used for the purpose of detecting, recognising or identifying natural persons, with the exception of the verification of travel document.

Such listing raises several questions, on a twofold perspective. On the one hand, certain AI applications – such as those used to predict migratory movements – fall outside the scope of the high-risk category, despite the opposite stance taken, during the legislative process, by the European Parliament⁹. On the other, emotion recognition systems – such as polygraphs – are not prohibited in the field of migration, despite the serious concerns stemming from their contested scientific basis¹⁰ and their intrusiveness. Instead, these motivations were invoked by the legislator to introduce a specific prohibition of emotion recognition systems in the workplace and in education institutions (art. 5, para. 1, lett. f) and recital n. 44 AI Act)¹¹.

Beyond these criticalities, for systems classified as high-risk, providers must comply with the stringent requirements on risk management, data governance, technical documentation, record-keeping, transparency, human oversight, accuracy and cybersecurity (artt. 8 – 15 AI Act).

⁹ Negotiating position of the European Parliament, doc. P9_TA(2023)0236. See amendments nn. 736-737 on the proposal to additionally include, among the high-risk use cases, also: «d(a) AI systems intended to be used by or on behalf of competent public authorities or by Union agencies, offices or bodies in migration, asylum and border control management to monitor, surveil or process data in the context of border management activities, for the purpose of detecting, recognising or identifying natural persons; d(b) AI systems intended to be used by or on behalf of competent public authorities or by Union agencies, offices or bodies in migration, asylum and border control management for the forecasting or prediction of trends related to migration movement and border crossing».

¹⁰ L. F. BARRETT, R. ADOLPHS, S. MARSELLA, A. M. MARTINEZ, S. D. POLLAK, [Emotional Expressions Reconsidered: Challenges to Inferring Emotion from Human Facial Movements](#) in *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, vol. 20, n. 1, 2019, pp. 1-68; J. SÁNCHEZ-MONEDERO, L. DENCİK, [The Politics of Deceptive Borders: 'Biomarkers of Deceit' and the Case of iBorderCtrl](#), in *Information, Communication & Society*, vol. 25, n. 3, 2022, pp. 413 – 430.

¹¹ More extensively on this topic, see also E. PANDOLFI, *cit.*

In addition to that, deployers have the duty to inform natural persons whenever they use a high-risk system that makes decisions or assists in making decisions (art. 26, para. 11 AI Act) and to perform a fundamental rights impact assessment (art. 27 AI Act). Moreover, they must confer a right to individual explanation to people affected by decisions based on the output of high-risk AI systems. This shall be clear and meaningful and refer to the role of the AI system in the decision-making procedure and to the main elements of the decision taken (art. 86, para. 1 AI Act).

The right to algorithmic explanation represents a *uniquum* in the AI Act, which – being mainly a product safety instrument¹² – does not introduce individual rights. Accordingly, this provision, while absent in the legislative proposal presented in 2021 by the European Commission, was added upon the initiative of the European Parliament.

Alongside the new rules under the AI Act – not entirely applicable yet, following the recent prorogation introduced with [Regulation 2026/1744](#) (Digital Omnibus on AI)¹³ – automated systems were already subject to EU data protection law.

According to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), specific transparency rules and individual rights are recognised in respect of solely automated decisions, *i.e.* decisions adopted using technological means and without human involvement.

Despite a general prohibition (art. 22, para. 1 GDPR), solely automated decisions are allowed when based on: (a) contractual necessity; (b) a statutory provision under EU or national law; (c) the data subject's explicit consent (art. 22, para. 2).

When these derogations operate, the data subject shall be granted further safeguards. These include: the right to obtain *ex ante* (artt. 13, para. 2, lett. f) –

¹² See M. ALMADA, N. PETIT, *The EU AI Act: Between the rock of product safety and the hard place of fundamental rights*, in *Common Market Law Review*, vol. 62, n. 1, 2025, pp. 85 – 120.

¹³ The application of sections 1, 2 and 3 of Chapter III – detailing the substantial obligations imposed on providers and deployers of high-risk systems – has been postponed to 2 December 2027, as compared to the previous date of 2 August 2026. Whether the prorogation also concerns the right to explanation is debatable, considering that, differently from the other obligations of the deployer, the provision of art. 86 falls under a different heading of the AI Act, not invested by the amendment. However, it could be questioned whether, absent the other safeguards applicable to high-risk systems, the deployer will be able to effectively recognise such right.

14, para. 2, lett. g) GDPR) and to access *ex post* (art. 15, para. 1, lett. h) GDPR) information concerning the existence of the solely automated process and meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing; the right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view and to contest the solely automated decision (art. 22, para. 3 GDPR). In the [*Dun & Bradstreet Austria*](#) ruling, the CJEU stated that the data subject shall be additionally recognised – on the basis of the provision on data access – a right to a clear and meaningful explanation of the procedure and principles actually applied in order to use, by automated means, his or her personal data (para. 58). Such explanation performs an instrumental function, as its main purpose is to enable the data subject to effectively exercise the rights to express his or her point of view on that decision and to contest it (para. 55).

3. The right to algorithmic explanation under EU law

The introduction of the right to explanation under EU law raises the question as to whether it applies in respect of algorithmic systems used in the field of migration. Indeed, migrants are increasingly subject to automated and AI systems that are deployed, *inter alia*, to adopt decisions or assist the human agent in doing so, with significant repercussions on their personal sphere and fundamental rights.

As previously mentioned, the CJEU clarified that a right to explanation exists under data protection rules on solely automated decisions (art. 15 – 22 GDPR), while the legislator introduced it as part of the legal framework applicable to high-risk AI systems (art. 86 AI Act).

While a comprehensive analysis of the two frameworks falls outside the scope of the present contribution, it is worth mentioning that these are closely aligned. Indeed, art. 86 AI Act adopts, *in parte qua*, the wording of art. 22 GDPR. Both provisions prescribe that the right to explanation exists in respect of decisions that produce legal effects or similarly significantly affect the person or the data subject. Moreover, despite not being framed in identical terms, the explanation shall be, under both acts, clear and meaningful. Accordingly, it shall not imply the disclosure of information on the technical functioning of

the system¹⁴, but it must refer to the individual decision adopted.

At the same time though, a fundamental difference between the two acts lies in the respective scope of application¹⁵.

Under the GDPR framework, the right to explanation is recognised insofar as the decision-making process is solely automated and does not entail human involvement. The Article 29 Working Party (WP29), [in its guidelines](#), stated that this cannot be fabricated, and that, in order to exclude the applicability of art. 22, the controller must ensure that any oversight of the decision is meaningful and is carried out by someone who has the authority and competence to change it.

The CJEU – in the [Schufa](#) judgement – adopted an extensive interpretation of art. 22, considering a decision to be solely automated if the human subject adopting it draws strongly on a previous automated decision. It follows that the degree of human involvement necessary to exclude its applicability requires a case-by-case assessment¹⁶.

In the field of migration, the rules on automated decision-making, including the right to explanation, would consequently apply in the event of a decision – such as one allowing or denying entrance at the EU external border or refusing international protection – that is solely automated or is adopted by the human agent by drawing strongly on the algorithmic output.

Differently, under the AI Act, the right to explanation must be granted by the deployer who adopts a decision on the basis of the output of a high-risk AI system (art. 86, para. 1 AI Act). Among them, as previously mentioned, are those systems used in the field of migration, asylum and border control management (Annex III, n. 7).

Art. 86 applies to solely and semi-automated decisions, *i.e.* decisions that

¹⁴ [Dun & Bradstreet Austria](#), para. 58-59: « (...) that explanation must be provided by means of relevant information and in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form. Those requirements cannot be satisfied either by the mere communication of a complex mathematical formula, such as an algorithm, or by the detailed description of all the steps in automated decision-making, since none of those would constitute a sufficiently concise and intelligible explanation».

¹⁵ Establishing a clear demarcation between, on the one hand, artt. 15 - 22 GDPR and, on the other, art. 86 AI Act is necessary insofar as, according to art. 86, para. 3, the right to explanation under the AI Act shall apply only to the extent that it is not otherwise provided for under Union law.

¹⁶ F. PALMIOTTO, [When Is a Decision Automated? A Taxonomy for a Fundamental Rights Analysis](#), in *German Law Journal*, n. 25, 2024, p. 215.

include humans in and on the loop¹⁷. Accordingly, human involvement does not exclude the application of the right to explanation, differently from the GDPR framework.

Under the AI Act, human oversight represents, instead, an essential requirement in the legal framework applicable to high-risk systems, as clearly visible by referring to the obligations established under artt. 13 – 14 of the regulation. These prescribe that – in order to guarantee the deployer correctly interprets a system’s output and uses it appropriately – the provider must ensure that the operation of high-risk systems is sufficiently transparent (art. 13, para. 1 AI Act). Moreover, natural persons to whom human oversight is assigned shall be enabled, *inter alia*: (a) to properly understand the relevant capacities and limitations of the high-risk AI system and to duly monitor its operation; (b) to remain aware of the possible tendency of automatically relying or over-relying on its output (automation bias); and (d) to decide, in any particular situation, not to use the high-risk AI system or to otherwise disregard, override or reverse the AI-based decision (art. 14, para. 4 AI Act).

The fulfilment of the abovementioned conditions represents a prerequisite for granting the right to explanation. Without a comprehensive understanding of the functioning of the AI system itself, the deployer would be at great difficulty in providing an explanation of the adopted decision.

This appears particularly complicated when highly opaque and contested systems are used. It is the case, for instance, of emotion recognition systems that, in the migration field, are not prohibited. Moreover, although the postponement disposed with the Digital Omnibus on AI did not expressly affect the provision of art. 86¹⁸, it seems unlikely that the right to explanation can be effectively recognised by the deployer before the essential requirements on transparency and human oversight are implemented by the provider of the high-risk AI system.

As a final remark, it is worth noting that, under the AI Act, the instrumental role of the explanation is substantially weakened by the lack of a right to

¹⁷ G. MALGIERI, *The Right to Explanation in the AI Act (Article 86)*, in G. MALGIERI, G. GONZÁLEZ-FUSTER, A. MANTELERO, G. ZANFIR-FORTUNA (eds.), *The EU Artificial Intelligence Act: a Thematic Commentary*, Oxford, 2026, p. 512.

¹⁸ See *supra* note 14.

contest the AI-based decision, differently from the GDPR framework which explicitly introduces it under art. 22, para. 3.

4. Conclusion

The management of the migration phenomenon has been invested by a process of digitalisation and automation, enabled by the deployment of algorithmic systems in border control activities, as well as in procedures for granting refugee status and international protection.

Against the inherent risks associated to these technologies, the EU introduced, under the AI Act, a specific discipline for certain AI systems used in the field of migration. This applies without prejudice to the rules on automated decision-making already established under data protection law, notably by the GDPR.

Accordingly, the two legal frameworks recognise a right to explanation. While contributing to the transparent and fair deployment of algorithmic systems in migration-related procedures, the explanation is particularly relevant in respect of migrants, who are often vulnerable subjects and are dependent on the outcome of the actions of the competent public authorities.

Under both acts, the explanation to be provided to the affected person shall be clear, meaningful and it shall refer to the specific decision adopted by or with the support of an automated system.

As compared to the GDPR, the AI Act has a greater scope of application. While the former applies to solely automated processes, the latter further encompasses semi-automated decisions, adopted by the human agent on the basis of the algorithmic output. By contrast, the AI Act does not introduce a right to contest the AI-based decision, differently from the GDPR, which, in this regard, provides additional safeguards to the person *vis a vis* the algorithmic system.

Riferimenti bibliografici

M. ALMADA, N. PETIT, *The EU AI Act: Between the rock of product safety and the hard place of fundamental rights*, in *Common Market Law Review*, vol. 62, n. 1, 2025, pp. 85 – 120.

- L. F. BARRETT, R. ADOLPHS, S. MARSELLA, A. M. MARTINEZ, S. D. POLLAK, [*Emotional Expressions Reconsidered: Challenges to Inferring Emotion from Human Facial Movements*](#) in *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, vol. 20, n. 1, 2019, pp. 1 – 68.
- C. BLASI CASAGRAN, C. BOLAND, E. SÁNCHEZ-MONTIJANO, E. VILÀ SÁNCHEZ, [*The Role of Emerging Predictive IT Tools in Effective Migration Governance*](#) in *Politics and Governance*, vol. 9, n. 4, 2021, pp. 133 – 145.
- E. BROUWER, [*EU's AI Act and Migration Control. Shortcomings in Safeguarding Fundamental Rights*](#), in *Verfassungsblog*, 12 December 2024.
- J. P. BURGESS, D. KLOZA (eds.), [*Border Control and New Technologies. Addressing Integrated Impact Assessment*](#), Brussels, 2021.
- C. DUMBRAVA, [*Artificial Intelligence at EU Borders. Overview of Applications and Key Issues*](#), EPRS, 2021.
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION, [*Opportunities and Challenges for the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Border Control, Migration and Security. Volume 1*](#), 2020.
- N. KINCHIN, D. MOUGOUEI, [*What Can Artificial Intelligence Do for Refugee Status Determination? A Proposal for Removing Subjective Fear*](#), in *International Journal of Refugee Law*, n. 34, 2022, pp. 373 – 397.
- G. MALGIERI, *The Right to Explanation in the AI Act (Article 86)*, in G. MALGIERI, G. GONZÁLEZ-FUSTER, A. MANTELERO, G. ZANFIR-FORTUNA (eds.), *The EU Artificial Intelligence Act: a Thematic Commentary*, Oxford, 2026, pp. 509 – 531.
- A. PALAZZI, [*Quando l'Intelligenza Artificiale \(IA\) contribuisce a decidere in materia di asilo: prospettive e questioni aperte nel diritto dell'Unione europea*](#), in *Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza*, 3/2025, pp. 1 – 26.
- F. PALMIOTTO, [*When Is a Decision Automated? A Taxonomy for a Fundamental Rights Analysis*](#), in *German Law Journal*, n. 25, 2024, pp. 210 – 236.
- E. PANDOLFI, *Migrazioni algoritmiche: l'AI Act e la regolazione europea delle tecnologie di frontiera*, in M. INGLESE, A. ROSANÒ (a cura di), [*I 40 Anni dell'accordo di Schengen: risultati e prospettive, Atti del Convegno Università di Parma 18-19 dicembre 2025*](#), in *Quaderni AISDUE - Serie Convegni e Seminari*, n. 1, Napoli, 2026, pp. 149 – 174.

G. ROMEO, [*Gli strumenti di previsione dei flussi migratori: quali problemi giuridici*](#), in *ADiM Blog, Analisi & Opinioni*, dicembre 2022.

J. SÁNCHEZ-MONEDERO, L. DENCİK, [*The Politics of Deceptive Borders: ‘Biomarkers of Deceit’ and the Case of iBorderCtrl*](#), in *Information, Communication & Society*, vol. 25, n. 3, 2022, pp. 413 – 430.

G. SARTOR, *L’informatica giuridica e le tecnologie dell’informazione*, Torino, 2022.

STATEWATCH, [*A Clear and Present Danger. Missing Safeguards on Migration and Asylum in the EU’s AI Act*](#), 2022.

L. S. STEWART, [*The Regulation; of AI-Based Migration Technologies under the EU AI Act: \(Still\) Operating in the Shadows?*](#), in *European Law Journal*, n. 30, 2024, pp. 122 – 135.

N. VAVOULA, [*Regulating AI at Europe’s Borders: Where the AI Act Falls Short*](#), in *Verfassungsblog*, 13 December 2024.

To cite this contribution: E. PANDOLFI, *The Right to Algorithmic Explanation in Migration and Asylum*, ADiM Blog, September 2026.